Evaluation of Default Risk for The Brazilian Banking Sector by Marcelo Y. Takami & Benjamin M. Tabak
ISSN 1518-3548
Evaluation of Default Risk for the Brazilian Banking Sector
Marcelo Y. Takami and Benjamin M. Tabak
May, 2007
Working Paper Series 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
ISSN 1518-3548 
CGC 00.038.166/0001-05 
 
Working Paper Series 
 
Brasília 
 
n. 135 
 
May 
 
2007 
 
P. 1-35  
Working Paper Series 
 
 
 
 
Edited by Research Department (Depep) – E-mail: workingpaper@bcb.gov.br 
 
Editor: Benjamin Miranda Tabak – E-mail: benjamin.tabak@bcb.gov.br 
Editorial Assistent: Jane Sofia Moita – E-mail: jane.sofia@bcb.gov.br 
Head of Research Department: Carlos Hamilton Vasconcelos Araújo – E-mail: carlos.araujo@bcb.gov.br  
 
The Banco Central do Brasil Working Papers are all evaluated in double blind referee process. 
  
Reproduction is permitted only if source is stated as follows: Working Paper n. 135. 
 
Authorized by Mário Mesquita, Deputy Governor for Economic Policy. 
 
 
 
General Control of Publications 
 
Banco Central do Brasil 
Secre/Surel/Dimep 
SBS – Quadra 3 – Bloco B – Edifício-Sede – M1 
Caixa Postal 8.670 
70074-900 Brasília – DF – Brazil 
Phones: (5561) 3414-3710 and 3414-3567 
Fax: (5561) 3414-3626 
E-mail: editor@bcb.gov.br 
 
 
 
The views expressed in this work are those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect those of the Banco Central or  
its members. 
 
Although these Working Papers often represent preliminary work, citation of source is required when used or reproduced. 
 
 
As opiniões expressas neste trabalho são exclusivamente do(s) autor(es) e não refletem, necessariamente, a visão do Banco 
Central do Brasil. 
 
Ainda que este artigo represente trabalho preliminar, citação da fonte é requerida mesmo quando reproduzido parcialmente. 
 
 
 
Consumer Complaints and Public Enquiries Center 
 
Address: Secre/Surel/Diate 
  Edifício-Sede – 2º subsolo 
  SBS – Quadra 3 – Zona Central 
  70074-900 Brasília – DF – Brazil 
Fax: (5561)  3414-2553 
Internet: http://www.bcb.gov.br/?english 
   3 
Evaluation of Default Risk for the Brazilian Banking Sector 
 
 
Marcelo Y. Takami
* 
Benjamin M. Tabak
**
 
 
 
The Working Papers should not be reported as representing the views of the 
Banco Central do Brasil. The views expressed in the papers are those of the 
author(s) and do not necessarily reflect those of the Banco Central do 
Brasil. 
 
 
Abstract 
 
This paper employs new methods to measure and monitor risk in the 
Brazilian banking sector. We prove that the option-based risk measure is 
negatively sensitive to interest rates. As this is an important issue for 
emerging market economies, the risk measures are built as deviations from 
mean. Additionally, the option-based indicator is compared with market-
based financial fragility indicators. Results show that these indicators are 
useful for risk managers and regulators, especially during crisis. 
Furthermore, option-based methods are preferable to classify banks in 
periods of high distress, such as the banking crises that occurred in the early 
nineties in Brazil. 
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1.  Introduction 
The past two decades have witnessed many banking crises around the world. These 
crises have important implications for the economy as a whole. Hoggarth et al. (2002) 
studied the costs of banking system instability and found that the cumulative output 
losses incurred during crises are 15-20% of annual GDP, on average.  
The increase in financial fragility around the globe in the 1990s led to the 
development of financial indicators that are used in early warning systems. Recent 
literature has suggested indicators that employ market data such as data on equity prices 
and options and accounting information to unveil the risk in the banking system 
(Vassalou and Xing, 2004). 
This paper contributes to the literature by adapting market and option-based 
financial stability indexes for an emerging market economy. We have calculated 
banking vulnerability indicators based on equity prices and balance sheets for individual 
banks and showed that these indicators have forecasting power and may be used to 
assess financial fragility. We innovate by calculating relative risk indexes (section 6), 
because within this approach the comparison of risk levels of different banks is 
straightforward. If specific banks have a high-risk profile compared to their peers, then 
they may be seen as high-risk banks, although their absolute risk level may not be large. 
In this sense, we argue that these indicators should also be sensitive to the interest rate, 
especially for emerging market countries, where crises have often been accompanied by 
high interest rate volatility. We underpin our argument by: 
a)  the calculation of the derivative of the risk measure on interest rate (section 3); 
b)  simulations (section 3); 
c)  empirical analysis of the Brazilian experience (section 6). 
The Brazilian experience represents an interesting case study due to its relevance in 
Latin America and because its financial system has been through structural changes in 
the past decades, with large increases in banking productivity (privatization, merges and 
acquisitions), but also with changes in the complexity of its financial operations, in an 
environment of, until recent years, substantial macroeconomic volatility. Specifically, 
the Brazilian banking system suffered a banking crisis in 1994-1996, when the 
introduction of the Real and the subsequent defeat of inflation deprived banks of   5 
substantial float income. Hoggarth et al. (2002) estimate that the fiscal and quasi-fiscal 
costs of the Brazilian banking crises of 1994-1996 was within 5-10% of annual GDP, 
while the ratio of non-performing loans over total loans peaked at 15%.  
We aim to contribute to the literature in three ways. First, we present an important 
limitation of the option-based methodology, especially when applied to emerging 
markets. Second, we employ recently developed methodologies to estimate bank default 
risk and compare these methodologies in the context of emerging markets (Vassalou 
and Xing, 2002 and Lehar, 2005). Finally, we show that these financial fragility 
indicators may prove useful for regulators and risk managers. Our empirical results 
suggest that option-based methods may prove useful in classifying financially 
embarrassed banks, especially in periods of financial distress. 
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows: Section 2 provides a brief 
literature review; Section 3 discusses the limitation of the option-based method; Section 
4 presents the methodology, while Section 5 gives a brief overview of the Brazilian 
banking industry and of the Brazilian banking system restructuring program (PROER); 
section 6 discusses the empirical results and Section 7 concludes the paper. 
 
2.  Literature Review 
When financial systems stop working, the cost in terms of social welfare can be 
substantial, as bank crises are associated with the slow down of economic activity, high 
inflation, tax increases and currency depreciation (Hoggarth et al. 2002). The health of 
the banking system is, therefore, one of the main concerns of supervisory authorities.  
The need for monitoring banking risk has led to the search of indicators of economic 
disequilibrium to complement direct supervision. In particular, the market value of 
stocks and bonds of banks has the potential of revealing information regarding the 
economic-financial equilibrium of a bank, under the hypothesis that markets price risk 
correctly. A clear advantage of the use of market prices as opposed to direct supervision 
is that the market information is available on a high-frequency basis (Jobert et al 
(2004)).  
The literature is divided into two main lines of research. Part of the literature 
suggests that fundamentals of banks and firms can be captured by accounting 
information and can be used for monitoring bank risk. This literature suggests that   6 
accounting variables can capture bankruptcy risk (Altman, 1968; Altman et al., 1977; 
Lau, 1987). However, another strand of the literature has used market data, such as 
stock and option prices, to build financial stability indicators (Clare and Priestley, 2002; 
Tabak and Staub, 2006). However, recent literature has employed both market data and 
accounting information to extract information regarding the implied default probability 
of firms and banks (Vassalou and Xing, 2004; Lehar, 2005; Bystrom et al., 2006).  
Using market data, Clare and Priestley (2002) calculated the probability of 
bankruptcy in the Norwegian banking sector before and after banking crises in Norway. 
They found empirical evidence that showed an increase of systemic risk starting in 
1984, right after the deregulation of this sector, and a decrease beginning in 1992. The 
details of the methodology for estimation of our market-based risk measure are 
described in section 4.1. 
Vassalou and Xing (2004) used the option-pricing model of Merton (1974) to 
calculate indicators of bankruptcy probability for individual North American firms 
using data from the stock market. These authors investigated how bankruptcy risk 
affects stock returns and found evidence that balance sheets contain information related 
to the bankruptcy of firms and that bankruptcy risk represents a systemic risk. In 
subsection 4.2, we describe their methodology to calculate distance-to-default. 
Lehar (2005) proposed a new method to measure and monitor systemic risk in the 
financial system. The innovation was about incorporating the interdependence between 
banks into Merton’s (1974) framework in order to estimate risk measures. The author 
concluded that high correlation between bank assets implied a higher probability of 
multiple bankruptcies and that larger and most profitable banks presented lower 
systemic risk. The distances-to-default of our paper are derived from Lehar’s 
methodology, which is detailed in subsection 4.2. 
On approaches to emerging market economies, Bystrom et al (2005) applied the 
Merton model (1974) to 50 firms listed in a stock index of Thailand and verified a 
significant rise of the probability of default around a crisis and a slow reversion to pre-
crisis levels as well as a negative relationship between firm size and the probability of 
default of the corresponding company only during crises.  
The literature on the Brazilian banking system is scant, despite its relative 
importance in Latin America. Moreover, the approaches do not employ option-based   7 
methodologies to extract information regarding bank system vulnerabilities. Tabak and 
Staub (2006) have built a financial stability index for Brazilian banks and suggested that 
macroeconomic stability has helped the stability of the domestic banking system. 
Tannuri and Sales (2005) suggested that the Brazilian banking system-restructuring 
program (PROER) had an effect on the reduction of bankruptcy probability in Brazil in 
the late 1990s.  
This paper contributes to the literature by adapting market and option-based models 
to derive financial stability indexes for an emerging market banking sector. 
 
3.  Limitations of the option-based approach 
We discuss now a few limitations of this methodology. According to Merton (1974) 
the value of the asset of the firm, Vt, is assumed to follow a geometric Brownian 
motion: 
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1 Lehar (2005) and Ronn and Verma (1986) did not include the risk free interest rate explicitly in the 
equations, because the value of the debt is already adjusted for present value.   8 
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where τ is the length of time until maturity, r is the risk-free interest rate and X is 
the strike price of the option (face value of debt from the balance sheet). In our 
empirical exercise we fix debt maturity to one year
2. Equity prices Et are used in order 
to solve equation (2) for the bank´s asset value (Vt). 
The default distance (ddt) is calculated according to the following formula:
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As for the calibration process, we verify that: i) in the iterative method of Vassalou 
and Xing (2004), the convergence of the algorithm depends on the initial bid of the 
market value of asset Vt, and ii) in the methodology of Lehar (2005), the resulting 
parameters of calibration (σ and Vt) are highly sensitive to the scale of entry variables 
(Et and Xt), especially at the period prior to the introduction of the Real. 
Furthermore, it is observed that the distance to default is significantly sensitive to 
the interest rate. For the same calibration methodology, the higher the interest rate, the 
lower the present value of the debt (as indicated by the term Xe
-r(τ) in equation 2). 
According to equation 2, the market value of the assets should be lower for a given 
value of Et. Thus, the chance of the market value of the assets covering the value of the 
debt will be lower and, therefore, the distance to default (ddt) will be smaller and the 
default risk will be higher. Analytically, it is expected that  0 <
∂
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r
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. Therefore, taking 
the derivatives of (2) and (3) with respect to the interest rate r, we have:  
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2 We also allow for shorter debt maturity and compare results. However, qualitative results remain 
unchanged. 
3 See deduction in Vassalou and Xing (2004)   9 
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Alternatively, we evaluate the sensibility of dd to the interest rate, calculating 
firstly the market value of assets (Vt) corresponding to real interest rates between 0 and 
100%, according to equation 1 and maintaining the other variables (Et/Xt e σ) at a fixed 
value (their averages for each bank was adopted as a reference). Then, we replaced each 
Vt in equation 2, obtaining different values of distance to default. Figure 1 shows that 
the distances to default of banks B, E and F, which presented lower Et/Xt ratio, are more 
sensitive to interest rates.   11 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 1 – Distances to default x interest rates 
For each bank we present how sensitive the distance to default is to the variation of its cost of opportunity. As we can notice, banks 
E and F are significantly more sensitive than banks A and C. 
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  Due to this limitation, we estimate deviations of the distance to default from a 
reference value (average distance to default of the 6 banks weighted by the total debt) 
for each bank and for each month. The results are in section 6. 
 
4.  Methodology 
4.1. Market-based methodology 
We estimate a market-based default measure by using the methodology described in 
Clare and Priestley (2002). Through a conditional version of CAPM (Capital Asset 
Pricing Model), a measure of variability is derived using market data. 
According to the CAPM, for an individual stock i and for an instant of time t, we 
have:  ) R
~
E( ) R
~
E( St it it β   =   , where  ) R
~
E( it  is the expected excess return of stock i and 
) R
~
E( St  is the expected excess return of the market portfolio. If the expected returns are 
correct on average, we have:  
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where eit is the residual term. 
  Finally, we obtain the market-based risk measure just by calculating the inverse 
of the standard deviation of the residual term: 
it e σ
1 . Clare and Priestley (2002) derive 
this statistic by dividing the market value of equity by its standard deviation, i.e., this 
statistic represents the number of standard deviations that a company is distant from 
default point
4. The smaller this value, the closer the company will be to default and the 
higher its default risk will be. We calculated 
it e σ
1  on a monthly basis with a moving 
window of m business days, applying a regression (OLS) to the data of this moving 
window, according to the following single factor model: 
 
Rit = β0 + β1RSt + eit,         ( 1 3 )  
                                                 
4 Clare and Priestley (2002) obtain estimates eit using an AGARCH-M (Asymmetric Generalised 
Autoregressive Conditional Heteroskedasticity in Mean) model, which considers asymmetry of price in 
the conditional variance.   13 
where Rit is the return of bank i and RSt is the banking sector return.
5,6 
  The choice of the banking sector as the portfolio of reference, instead of a 
broader market portfolio, is due to the difference in financial performance of the 
Brazilian banking sector as opposed to other industries, mainly before the introduction 
of the Real.  
 
4.2. Option based methodology 
The calculation of the option-based risk measure was based on two papers: Vassalou 
and Xing (2004) and Lehar (2005). They only differ in the methodology used to 
calibrate the instantaneous volatility (σ). Vassalou and Xing (2004) use the following 
algorithm: first of all, an initial value σ
0 (0-iteration) is attributed to σ. This initial value 
σ
0=σE is simply the standard deviation
7 of the continuous return on equity prices Et for 
the corresponding moving window of m business days
8. Then, they replace σ
(k-1) (or σ
(k-
1)=σ
0 if the algorithm is in its 0-iteration) in equation 2 to calculate Vt for each day 
along the corresponding window of m business days. Of course, we also have to use the 
given values of Et, Xt and rt in equation 2 for each day. Then, taking all those m values 
of Vt, we calculate σ
k by simply computing the standard deviation of Vt. While σ
k - σ
k-1 
> tolerance interval, σ
k is replaced in equation 2 for a new calculation of the m values of 
Vt’s. This loop iterates until σ
k converges within an arbitrarily tiny tolerance interval 
(1e-06 in our case).  
On the other hand, Lehar (2005) estimates (μ,σ) through maximization of the 
following log-likelihood function
9:  
 
                                                 
5 We tested several CAPM specifications, with different proxies for interest rates, and the estimated 
default risk for each bank was practically equal.  
6 For banks A, C and D, we take the PN shares (preferred), while for the banks B, E, and F, we take the 
ON (ordinary) shares. The choice of the type of stock was made depending on the availability of data. 
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9 The author proceeds in this way alleging that asset volatility is difficult to estimate, because it is not 
linear in the equity volatility. In this sense, this procedure overcomes such problem.    14 
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The solution of this maximization problem was found by using the quadratic hill-
climbing algorithm of Goldfeld et al. (1966). Notice that  ) ( ˆ σ t V  is an implicit function 
of σ according to equation 2. Our paper employs both methodologies and compares the 
results. 
For both calibration methodologies, μ is given by  ) 1 (
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the default distance (ddt) is calculated on a monthly basis according to equation 3. 
The default distance consists of the number of standard deviations that the firm is 
away from the default point. This measure is a proxy for a firm’s default risk. The more 
positive the ddt, the lower the probability that the firm will default on its debt. 
 
4.3. Data Sample 
The daily values of equities of 6 large Brazilian banks with traded stocks at the Sao 
Paulo Stock Exchange (Bovespa) were obtained from the Economática database and the 
monthly values of debt were collected from the Central Bank of Brazil. Daily Brazilian 
interest rates (DI-OVER) were collected from Bloomberg and the consumer price index 
(CPI) from the www.ipeadata.gov.br
10 site. The CPI was used to deflate market and 
debt values. We collected daily data of financial time series and monthly observations 
for accounting information, covering the period from March 1988 to February 2005. 
                                                 
10 The DI-OVER series was chosen because it presents data from October 1986, while the series of swap 
PRE-DI, for example, presents data only from January 1995.   15 
5.  An Overview of the Brazilian Banking System 
The Brazilian banking system is the largest in Latin America and also the most 
sophisticated in terms of technology. Many changes have taken place in the past two 
decades, with a substantial increase in bank productivity, as well as a rise in merges and 
acquisitions, which resulted in a higher concentration of the banking system (Nakane 
and Weintraub, 2005; Beck et al., 2005).  
One of the main changes in the Brazilian banking system was the consolidation of 
the defeat of inflation in early 1994 with the introduction of the Real. Before the Real, a 
large part of the profit of Brazilian banks was based on gains from non-interest-bearing 
liabilities, such as cash deposits and resources in transit. From 1988 to 1994, the number 
of banks increased from 102 to 244 banks. After the introduction of the Real, some 
banks could not manage to promote the necessary adjustments for their survival in this 
new economic environment and ended up bankrupt. From 1995 to 2005, 55 financial 
institutions were liquidated, causing high financial and social costs. After the distress of 
the Banco Econômico (the 22
nd bank under intervention/liquidation since the 
introduction of the Real, which at the time was the 15th largest by assets) and to avoid a 
potential systemic crisis, the PROER was introduced on November 3, 1995, which kept 
mergers and acquisitions of banks under the ruling of the Central Bank. This program 
was aimed to provide credit and fiscal benefits to institutions interested in buying 
distressed banks
11. As a result of the introduction of PROER and the inflation-free 
environment, the banking sector shrunk to 184 banks in 2005. 
Therefore, the period from 1988 to 2005 may be viewed as a period of large 
transformations in the Brazilian banking system. Consequently, it is an interesting 
period to study the evolution of financial fragility indicators and whether they can help 
forecast bank failures.  
 
                                                 
11 See Nakane and Weintraub (2006) and Tannuri and Sales (2005).    16 
6.  Empirical Results 
Six large Brazilian banks (of which two – banks E and F – were liquidated in the 
second semester of 1996) were analyzed and the individual measures of default risk 
(distance to default – dd – and 
it e σ
1 ) were calculated on a monthly basis from May 
1989 to February 2005 using a moving window of m business days (m ≅ 255). All banks 
are private, except bank B, which is state-owned. 
We chose to compare the default distances and the deviations of these distances to 
the weighted mean, instead of default probabilities, due to its ordinal nature that is 
similar to a rating. According to Altman et al. (1977), this measure is not necessarily 
associated to a pre-defined value of default probability, as different types of distribution 
lead to different probability values. 
Regarding the option-based risk measures, based on Merton (1974), the magnitude 
of the distance to default (dd) according to Vassalou and Xing (2002) and Lehar (2005) 
are very similar through time for each bank and the correlations of these risk measures 
are high (close to 100% for banks A, B, C and D and to 92% for banks E and F). 
Therefore, we focus on the methodology described in Lehar (2005) as the estimation 
by the maximum likelihood function is considered more suitable. This suitability refers 
to the hypothesis that the value of the asset of the firm, Vt, is assumed to follow a 
geometric Brownian motion (see Duan (1994, 2000)). 
We observe a similarity among the evolution of banks until July 1995. This 
similarity concerns the option and market data-based methodologies as shown in Table 
1. This Table presents correlations of distance to default measures for banks, and then 
show a pair-wise similarity regarding risk dynamics
12. 
                                                 
12 The F statistics of Granger´s causality test were significant between banks A and C and between C and 
D at 10% of significance and were not significant between banks E and F.    17 
 
Table 1 – Correlation of each risk measure (dd and 
it e σ
1 ) for each pair of banks before July 1995* 
  A-C C-D A-D A-E A-F C-E C-F D-E D-F E-F 
dd  96% 92% 85% 82% 81% 85% 83% 96% 94%  100% 
it e σ
1   82% 60% 71% 25% 56% 43% 64% 45% 81% 74% 
* We do not compute pair-wise correlations using Bank B because its time series starts only in December 1994. 
In each column we present correlations between different banks for each risk measure. The table shows that there 
may have been some sector-like or pervasive economic factor in operation. 
 
The high positive pair-wise correlations (Table 1) indicate that the dynamics of 
individual risk measures were related to some sector-like or pervasive economic factor. 
We used the parameters estimated for the calculation of the measure based on the one 
factor model, and observed the prevalence of the systematic component (
2 2
m σ β ) over 
the idiosyncratic component (
2
it e σ ) for banks A and C (Table 2).
13 
Table 2 – Measures of systematic and idiosyncratic risk in relation to the total risk  
  Bank A  Bank B  Bank C  Bank D  Bank E  Bank F 
2 2 2
i m σ σ β   71% 46% 58%  13%  0,07% 0,35% 
2 2
i eit σ σ   29% 54% 42%  87%  99,93%  99,65% 
Average β   1,28 1,05 1,01  0,55  0,02  0,04 
In each column we present the breakdown of the total risk, according to the one factor model. The first and second 
lines present the proportion in total risk of systemic and idiosyncratic risks, while the last line presents average 
systemic risk. These measures are an average of the measures obtained on a monthly basis from May 89 to July 95. 
 
Besides, the larger share of idiosyncratic risk of the distressed banks (banks E 
and F), as shown in Table 2, is a clear indication of a distinct performance of these 
banks as opposed to the surviving banks as a whole. For the distressed banks, we 
obtained low values for β, which explains their low share of systematic risk. The 
relative measures dd and 
it e σ
1 capture this difference in performance and then, are 
helpful for assessing financial fragility in the banking system. 
                                                 
13 The ADF and KPSS tests were applied to the series of stock returns for each bank before estimating the 
β’s by OLS regressions and stationarity was achieved.   18 
Therefore, considering the ordinal nature of our risk measures and in an attempt 
to identify genuine idiosyncratic risk variations, we estimate the deviation of the 
distance to default from a reference value (average distance to default of the 6 banks 
weighted by the total debt) for each bank and for each month. Note that classifying 
banks in this way is more convenient than, for example, having to arbitrarily define a 
critical value below which a bank would be considered highly risky. This would have 
been the case, if the analysis had been developed using absolute values of distance to 
default measures (dd or 
it e σ
1 ). In this sense, we calculate deviations from mean and 
check whether it is possible to identify the relatively worse performance of distressed 
banks. This relative distance to default is shown in Figure 2 (negative deviations suggest 
that banks are underperforming in terms of default risk compared to the sector 
benchmark and vice-versa):   19 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2 – Relative distance to default (dd) 
For each bank we present relative risk measures for different periods. Banks E and F failed in this period, and their relative risk 
measures were below average for most of the sample, while A and C were above average (non failing institutions).  
 
Figure 2 suggests that dd fairly succeeds in correctly capturing the relative risk 
of each bank. The visual analysis of this figure suggests that the risk level of banks A 
and C were below average (higher relative default distances) during most of the period 
in analysis. Moreover, banks E and F, which suffered a government intervention in the 
second semester of 1995 and were liquidated a year later, presented the highest risk 
levels among the 5 banks in 84% of the months from May 1989 to July 1995. As for 
bank D, its risk levels remained above average (lower relative default distances) during 
the period prior to July 1995, but since that date, the default distances increased, 
reaching values above those of bank A for several months.  
Next, we test whether interest rates paid to depositors by banks show evidence 
of increasing risk (market discipline). If a bank’s funding rates show bank’s risk then 
we would expect that banks with higher risk pay higher interest rates on their deposits 
(CDB rates)
14. The Granger causality test results with 12 lags are presented in Table 3. 
                                                 
14 The same analysis was made with the weighted mean of the CDB rate for the 6 banks and the results 
are equivalent.  
Banks A and C: May 89 to July 95
-6
-4
-2
0
2
4
May-89
May-90
May-91
May-92
May-93
May-94
May-95
Banks A and C:
August 95 to February 2005
-25
-15
-5
5
15
25
35
Aug-95
Aug-97
Aug-99
Aug-01
Aug-03
Banks D, E and F: May 89 to July 95
-6
-4
-2
0
2
4
May-89
May-90
May-91
May-92
May-93
May-94
May-95
Banks B and D:
August 95 to February 2005
-25
-15
-5
5
15
25
35
Aug-95
Aug-97
Aug-99
Aug-01
Aug-03  20 
 
Table 3 – F statistics of the Granger causality test between weighted dd x average CDB (interest 
rates paid by banks on time deposits) and 
it e σ
1 weighted x average CDB
15 
 
  H1 H 2 H 3 H 4 
Before 
July/95  4,52* 4,21*  0,511  1,17 
After 
July/95  4,74*** 0,53  5,97***  0,599 
 
H1: weighted dd does not cause average CDB,  
H2: average CDB does not cause weighted dd,  
H3: weighted
it e σ
1  does not cause average CDB,  
H4: average CDB does not cause weighted 
it e σ
1  
***, ** and * stand for significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% level, 
respectively. 
 
This Table shows whether risk measures anticipate changes in interest 
rates paid by banks on time deposits, and whether the opposite holds 
true. 
 
 
We verify an increase in market discipline as indicated by highly significant F-
statistics under the columns H1 and H2 after July 95 (Table 3). It is also important to 
notice that in the recent period (after July 1995), our risk measures anticipate changes in 
banking funding rates. Therefore, it is worthwhile estimating such measures and 
monitoring them as they anticipate changes in banking funding rates, which may be a 
sign of problems in the banking system. 
Moreover, the explanatory power of both risk measures was compared, applying 
the following GMM regression: average CDBt = α0 + α1*mrt + εt, where mrt = 
{weighted dd, weighted
it e σ
1 } and εt is the residual term, assumed to be independent 
and identically distributed with zero mean and variance σ
2
ε. We employ mrt-1 as an 
instrumental variable.  The results are presented in Table 4. 
 
 
Table 4 – GMM regressions of the variables at aggregate levels  
 
Before July/95  After July/95  Explanatory 
variable  α0  α1  α0  α1 
Weighted dd 
0,333** 
(2,181) 
 
-0,306*** 
(-4,367) 
 
0,101*** 
(13,798) 
 
-0,002*** 
(-4,528) 
 
                                                 
15 Since the rejection to the non-stationality of the variables was not very strong, Granger´s causality test 
was also applied for the first difference between the variables. The results do not change qualitatively.    21 
Weighted 
it e σ
1   1,234 
(0,027) 
-0,008 
(-0,006) 
0,124*** 
(5,744) 
-0,0009** 
(-2,345) 
T-statistics are provided in parentheses. ***, ** and * stand for significance at the 1%, 
5% and 10% level, respectively. 
 
Average CDBt = α0 + α1*mrt + εt, 
where mrt = {weighted dd, weighted
it e σ
1  } and εt ∼ IID(0,σ
2
ε).  
mrt-1 was used as an instrumental variable.  mrt-1 seems to be a valid instrument because it 
is not expected to be correlated with the residual in the above regression. The residual in 
this regression captures other aspects of the decision on interest rates paid on deposits that 
are not related to risk, such as business policy and others.  
 
Together, the results of Tables 3 and 4 show evidence of market discipline for 
aggregate level after July 1995. The α1 coefficients, as shown in Table 4, are strongly 
significant and with the expected sign for weighted dd (an increase in the funding rate 
(CDB) must be related with an increase of risk measures and vice-versa).
16 
We apply the same GMM regression for banks A, C, E and F with relative 
average CDBi (average CDBi) as a dependent variable. It is expected that the α1 
coefficients are significant and with a positive sign. When this coefficient is positive 
then if banks are paying lower than average funding rates they must also be incurring in 
less relative risk.
17 It is important to notice that it is very difficult to assess whether 
options or market-based measures have a better performance, as is shown in Tables 5-7.  
                                                 
16 We employ Flemming (1998) to estimate these regressions.   
17 average CDBi = average CDB – CDB of the bank i.    22 
 
Table 5 – GMM regressions for bank A  
 
Before July/95  After July/95  Explanatory 
variable  α0  α1  α0  α1 
dd A  -0,022 
(-0,640) 
0,025 
(0,845) 
-0,003 
(-2,139) 
0,0006*** 
(4,068) 
 
it e σ
1 bank A  0,076 
(1,393) 
-0,004 
(-1,388) 
0,004 
(1,486) 
-7,14e-05 
(-0,601) 
T-statistics are provided in parentheses. ***, ** and * stand for significance at the 1%, 
5% and 10% level, respectively. 
 
Average CDBt = α0 + α1*mrt + εt, 
where mrt = {weighted dd, weighted
it e σ
1  } and εt ∼ IID(0,σ
2
ε).  
mrt-1 was used as an instrumental variable.  mrt-1 seems to be a valid instrument because it 
is not expected to be correlated with the residual in the above regression. The residual in 
this regression captures other aspects of the decision on interest rates paid on deposits that 
are not related to risk, such as business policy and others. 
 
 
Table 6 – GMM regressions for bank C 
Before July/95  After July/95  Explanatory 
variable  α0  α1  α0  α1 
dd C  0,008 
(0,573) 
-0,001 
(-0,145) 
0,0117** 
(2,165) 
-0,0002 
(-0,744) 
 
it e σ
1 bank C  0,017 
(1,128) 
-0,002 
(-1,139) 
0,007*** 
(2,890) 
-2,81e-05 
(0,207) 
T-statistics are provided in parentheses. ***, ** and * stand for significance at the 1%, 
5% and 10% level, respectively. 
 
Average CDBt = α0 + α1*mrt + εt, 
where mrt = {weighted dd, weighted
it e σ
1  } and εt ∼ IID(0,σ
2
ε).  
mrt-1 was used as an instrumental variable.  mrt-1 seems to be a valid instrument because it 
is not expected to be correlated with the residual in the above regression. The residual in 
this regression captures other aspects of the decision on interest rates paid on deposits that 
are not related to risk, such as business policy and others.   23 
Table 7 – GMM regressions for banks E and F from February/92 to July/95  
Bank E  Bank F  Explanatory 
variable  α0  α1  α0  α1 
dd  -0,007 
(-0,709) 
0,003 
(0,508) 
 
0,028 
(1,002) 
0,009 
(1,024) 
 
it e σ
1   0,008 
(0,703) 
0,001** 
(2,035) 
0,047 
(1,305) 
0,006 
(1,507) 
T-statistics are provided in parentheses. ***, ** and * stand for significance at the 1%, 
5% and 10% level, respectively. 
 
Average CDBt = α0 + α1*mrt + εt, 
where mrt = {weighted dd, weighted
it e σ
1  } and εt ∼ IID(0,σ
2
ε).  
mrt-1 was used as an instrumental variable.  mrt-1 seems to be a valid instrument because it 
is not expected to be correlated with the residual in the above regression. The residual in 
this regression captures other aspects of the decision on interest rates paid on deposits that 
are not related to risk, such as business policy and others. 
 
As we can see, although we obtain evidence of market discipline at an aggregate 
level (Tables 3 and 4), we didn’t obtain any evidence for individual banks (Tables 5-7). 
The deviations of the risk measures are slightly correlated with the deviations of the 
funding rate CDBi (average CDBi) and when α1’s are significant (only for two cases), 
they are low.
18 The CDB rate could be an inadequate proxy for the vulnerability 
variation of each bank, due to the lack of market discipline before 1995, as Table 8 
indicates. 
 
Table 8 – Dynamic relative risk position of each bank in the 1993-1995 period. 
  
  A  B C D E F 
CDB deviations  20%  0% 40% 8% 76%  72% 
dd deviations  0%  100%  24%  100% 100% 100% 
it e σ
1  deviations  0% 100% 16% 100%  100% 80% 
 
In the first line we present how often (% of months) banks paid interest rates above 
average for their time deposits, what should indicate risk above average, prevailing strong 
market discipline. In the second and third lines we present the proportion of months that 
these banks had their risk measures above average. 
 
Results of Table 8 suggest that for the period prior to 1995 market discipline was 
low, as distressed banks – banks E and F – were paying lower interest rates on their 
deposits than other banks in at least 24% of the months (we expected percentage values 
close to 0%, i.e., risk position close to 100%). One possible explanation is the effect of 
hyperinflation in the period, which could have inhibited market discipline. Not only by 
generating considerable gains in bank’s float but also for reducing the transparency of 
                                                 
18 The correlations between the risk measures and the deviation of CDB for each bank are low. Only bank 
A presented relatively high correlation (54%) between the dd deviation and the CDB deviation for the 
period after July 1995.    24 
the term structure of interest rates. Therefore, this evidence suggests that our 
vulnerability indicators may add value in monitoring and assessing banking 
vulnerabilities 
 
7.  Conclusions 
We present an important limitation for the option-based approach: it is 
negatively sensitive to interest rates. This sensitiveness seems to be crucial when 
applying that approach to emerging market banking sectors. Therefore, in order to 
assess default risks, we calculate deviations from mean.  
This paper compares two methodologies to assess banking risk and finds that 
option and market-based banking vulnerability indicators are important for monitoring 
banking risks. We have shown that these measures are helpful in assessing the 
likelihood of bank failures and have presented evidence of such for the Brazilian 1994-
1995 banking crisis.  
Overall, the option-based measure presented a risk classification closer to what one 
should expect than the market-based methodology. Therefore, empirical results suggest 
that models that incorporate both accounting information and market valuation may 
have performed better than models that rely solely on market information. 
We test whether risk measures are related to interest rates paid on time deposits, as 
the latter would be important indicators of bank’s financial conditions if market 
discipline is exerted in the banking system. However, empirical results suggest that 
market discipline was low in 1989-1995. Therefore, risk measures based on market and 
options data may be an important tool for assessing banking vulnerabilities.  
A few caveats apply to this study. Although large banks have traded stocks and debt 
in secondary markets in Brazil, many medium-sized, but still important banks do not. 
Therefore, we evaluate only a sample of the banking system. Measures that induce 
banks to open their capital and issue stocks could be seen as a way to increase 
transparency and help promote market discipline. Additional research could also focus 
on studying models which incorporate interest rate risk. 
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